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Somaesthetics of Discomfort
Enhancing Awareness and Inquiry
Mark Tschaepe
1 The following is  an introductory analysis  of  an underexplored point of  intersection
between inquiry and somaesthetics: bodily discomfort. I argue that this constitutes an
influential and important type of aesthetic experience that initiates certain inquiries,
alters bodily self-conception and establishes habits that have evaluative consequences
for  beliefs,  attitudes,  and  future  decisions.  Further,  aesthetic  experiences  of  bodily
discomfort  have the potential  for  contributing to  moral  imagination and tools  that
foster empathy in others. 
2 The argument  is  organized as  follows.  I  begin  with how irritation or  discomfort  is
considered an important aspect of inquiry by C.S. Peirce and John Dewey that may be
understood from a somatic perspective. I then discuss comfort and discomfort as types
of transient bodily experiences.  This includes defining the concepts of  comfort and
discomfort while delineating variations of each. Next, I provide a brief description of
somaesthetics and Mark Johnson’s related work against the backdrop of C.S. Peirce’s
categories and Dewey’s concept of qualitative feeling as they apply to experiences of
bodily discomfort. These considerations provide a basis for why we should recognize
these experiences as potentially aesthetic. I locate bodily discomfort at the intersection
of somaesthetics and inquiry and explain how discomfort may be considered a type of
aesthetic  experience.  This  segues into examples  of  bodily  discomfort  that  highlight
their  somaesthetic  importance.  Finally,  I  consider  the importance of  such aesthetic
experiences for fostering moral imagination and empathy in others that contributes to
creating  more  accommodating  considerations,  especially  in  design,  for  persons  to
achieve comfort.
 
1. Irritation and Inquiry
3 According to Peirce and Dewey, inquiry begins with doubt, which they describe as a
form of irritation, disruption, or perplexity.1 Peirce refers to doubt as a dissatisfied
state that is like “the irritation of a nerve,” later referring to “the irritation of doubt”
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that “causes a struggle to attain a state of belief” (CP.5.373-4). The shift from harmony
with the world one inhabits to disharmony with one’s world causes them to attempt to
adjust  and  remedy  their discord.  Here,  I  consider  irritations  that  are  somatic
discomforts,  contemplating Peirce’s notion of irritation literally.  There are not only
dis-harmonies  or  dis-cordances  of  thought,  but  also  bodily  dis-comforts.  Just  as
theoretical problems irritate so that systems of thought are called into question and
solutions  are  imagined,  reasoned  through,  and  tested,  so  too  do  somatic  problems
stimulate inquiry in efforts to alleviate problematic situations. A sore throat, an upset
stomach, a headache, a muscle cramp, a sudden burn or numbness, and countless other
maladies  propel  a  person  from  a  relative  state  of  comfort  into  phases  of  inquiry:
suggestion, intellectualization, hypothesis, reasoning, and experimentation (LW.8). In
the general scope of Peirce’s examination of experience and Dewey’s pattern of inquiry,
irritation is any experience that suspends or threatens belief and initiates doubt. Before
addressing how somatic discomfort, as a type of irritation that leads to inquiry, can be
aesthetic, it is important to clarify what I mean by bodily discomfort. 
4 Bodily discomfort is a type of physical irritation, generally speaking. To understand
bodily discomfort in this sense, first I review common meanings of comfort. As Kolcaba
and Kolcaba (1991) indicate, comfort has four general meanings in ordinary language.
First, comfort may be considered a cause of relief. Second, it may be considered a state
of comfort,  which refers to a state of ease or peaceful contentment.  For instance,  I
might say that  the actions of  the chiropractor were a  comfort  (first  meaning)  that
caused my comfort (second meaning). Third, comfort may refer to scalar relief from
discomfort. For instance, I may feel some comfort following a trip to the chiropractor,
but unlike the first meaning, this does not eradicate discomfort, but only diminishes it.
Finally, comfort may refer to things that contribute to hedonistic goals of maximizing
pleasure.  These  are  often  referred  to  as  creature  comforts.  Here,  I  use  the  second
definition primarily: comfort as a state of being. Specifically, comfort is a bodily state of
being that precedes and hopefully follows discomfort. Secondarily, comfort refers to
the result of inquiry that achieves some comfort but does not necessarily eradicate the
discomfort completely.
5 Following the work of Helander and Zhang (1997) and Bissell (2008), comfort is a bodily
“sensation  of  being-at-one  with  the  immediate  environment”  (2008:  1700).  This
aesthetic  sense  of  comfort  highlights  the  relationality  between  the  person  who
experiences  comfort  and  the  surroundings  they  inhabit.  This  also  points  to  the
importance of comfort as contextual, i.e., comfort according to the first meaning given
by Kolcaba and Kolcaba. Comfort also relates to Bissell’s notion of the experience as
specific affective resonance, which “can circulate between and through both objects and
bodies” (2008: 1701). Although this sense of comfort is not my focus when discussing
discomfort as a somaesthetic cause of inquiry, it is an important aspect of the concept
as  it  relates  to  discomfort  as  an aesthetic  experience  related to  attributes  of  one’s
environment. 
6 Discomfort is a somatic state of being ill-at-ease or discontented. More specifically, it is
the  experience  of  being  at-odds-with  the  immediate  environment  one  inhabits.
Discomfort  is  scalar  and  multidimensional.  It  is  experienced  at  varying  intensities,
locations,  and  durations.2 In  his  work  on  the  phenomenology  of  illness,  Fredrik
Svenaeus  captures  the  transition  from  comfort  to  discomfort  in  his  description  of
falling ill. Discomfort is an alienating process wherein a person experiences their body
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at  odds  with  itself  and  its  environment  (Svenaeus  2009,  2019).  Svenaeus  describes
illness as “an unhomelike being-in-the-world in which the embodied ways of being-in
of the person have been thwarted” (2019: 463). This description of illness applies to
discomfort,  which  is  a  symptom  that  often  accompanies  illness,  but  also  extends
beyond illness to those who are both healthy and in a state of transient discomfort (e.g.,
the  discomfort  of  airline  travel,  even  while  relatively healthy).  Discomfort  directs
attention to the state of the body and its relation to the world. Comfort,  similar to
health, is not a conscious aspect of experience usually. Experiencing discomfort, like
experiencing  illness  is  “to  find  oneself  in  a  pattern  of  disorientation,  resistance,
helplessness,  and  perhaps  even  despair”  (Svenaeus  2013:  232).  Morse  Bottorff  and
Hutchinson explain this as a theme of discomfort that they deem the dis-eased body:
“Disruption pervades the experience of the dis-eased body as one’s normal orientation
toward the world is deflected toward the body” (Morse, Bottorff & Hutchinson 1994:
190). Drew Leder refers to this experience as the dys-appearance of the body, wherein
attention to the body focuses on it feeling “ill” or “bad” (Leder 1990: 84). As a focus of
bodily feeling, discomfort should be considered from a somaesthetic perspective.
 
2. Somaesthetics and Feeling
7 According to Richard Shusterman, somaesthetics was “conceived to complement the
basic  project  of  pragmatist  aesthetics  by  elaborating  the  ways  that  a  disciplined,
rarified, and interdisciplinary attention to bodily experience, methods, discourses, and
performances could enrich our aesthetic experience and practices, not only in the fine
arts but in the diverse arts of living” (Shusterman 2012: 140). Somaesthetics was borne
from the transformational theory of aesthetics that Dewey presents in Art as Experience
(1989), his work on immediate experience and embodiment, and his therapeutic work
with  F.M. Alexander  (Shusterman  2009).  Mark  Johnson  was  similarly  inspired  by
Dewey’s  extensive  understanding  of  aesthetic  experience.  “Aesthetics  concerns  the
patterns, images, feelings, qualities, and emotions by which meaning is possible for us
in every aspect of our lives” (Johnson 2015: 23). According to Johnson, aesthetics is a
“field of inquiry” that supplies meaning to affordances, which emerge from the ways
we  engage  with  the  world  we  inhabit  (ibid.:  28).  Aesthetics,  according  to  this
interpretation, extends well beyond the exclusive confines of the fine arts or objects
considered as art. Additionally, Shusterman and Johnson consider aesthetics a dynamic
category of activity rather than a static category of fixed value.
8 Following  Dewey  and  Peirce,  Shusterman  and  Johnson  describe  experience  as
preeminently  qualitative.  Shusterman  describes  qualitative  feeling  as  being
ungraspably  immediate  (Shusterman  2008:  205).  Johnson  echoes  the  idea  when  he
states that “We are in and of the world via qualitative determination, before we know
it” (Johnson 2015: 28). Qualitative feeling as preeminent is an idea that guides Dewey’s
thought and was inspired by Peirce. The latter’s categories of experience provide tools
for  understanding  qualitative  experience  and  its  relation  to  discomfort  as
somaesthetic. 
9 Peirce categorizes experience into three types: Firsts (simples), Seconds (recurrences),
and Thirds (comprehensions) (CP.7.529). Firsts are qualitative and are the foundation of
experience. This category is also referred to as “suchness” and “tone of consciousness”
(CP.1.302;  7.530).  Aesthetic  experience  pertains  to  feeling  that  precedes  thought
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(Seconds;  fact)  and  generalization  (Thirds;  law)  (Hainic  2019).  A  feeling  (First)  is
experienced  before  it  is  considered  to  be  the  case  (Second)  and  before  it  can  be
categorized as  a  general  type of  feeling (Third).  In  his  discussion of  consciousness,
Peirce states, “[f]eeling is the momentarily present contents of consciousness taken in
its pristine simplicity, apart from anything else. It is consciousness in its first state…”
(CP.7.551). At the moment of feeling, it is “sensation minus the attribution of it to any
particular  subject”  (CP.1.332).  Shifting  attention  to  discomfort,  the  feeling  of
discomfort – irritation – is felt before it is considered to be a matter of fact, i.e., before
it is thought as a case of discomfort. For Peirce, aesthetics is rooted in feeling before
thoughts about feeling. 
10 Both Peirce and Dewey recognize that reflection is stimulated by feeling that irritates
or  perplexes.  Inquiry  occurs  when  one’s  “smooth  interaction”  with  the  world  is
disrupted  or  breaks  down  (Shusterman  2008:  187).  In  his  1930  essay,  “Qualitative
Thought,” Dewey echoes Peirce’s transition from feeling to thought when discussing
the experience of sweetness. “A certain quality is experienced. When it is inquired into
or thought (judged), it differentiates into ‘that thing’ on the one hand and ‘sweet’ on
the other” (LW.5:  253).3 Similarly,  discomfort  overwhelms experience without being
differentiated into a specific quality of the body or of the mismatch between the body
and its space. Here, Peirce’s term tone is helpful – discomfort is a tone of experience
before it  is  classified as  a  token (an instance)  or  type (generalization).  The body is
irritated. Irritation – feeling – initiates reflection, i.e., inquiry, which differentiates the
feeling  of  discomfort  as  pertaining  to  some  aspect  of  experience.  The  aesthetic  is
feeling – an all-consuming experience that stimulates reflection about the feeling as an
object of  thought.  Before reflection,  discomfort is  what Dewey calls  “brutely there”
(ibid.:  254).  Discomfort becomes the point of departure for inquiry.  As Dewey states
about qualitative experience, i.e., feeling, it is “the regulative principle of all thinking”
(ibid.: 261). Understanding discomfort as an aesthetic feeling that stimulates and guides
inquiry points to Peirce’s conception of aesthetics as guiding ethics and, in turn, logic.
11 According to Peirce, aesthetic science is normative because it determines what is good
or  bad  in  the  realm  of  feeling.  Determination  of  value  regarding  feeling  guides
determination of value in ethics and, transitively through ethics, of value in logic (CP.
5.130-2).  As  a  field  of  experience  and  inquiry,  aesthetics  concerns  the  deliberate
formation of habits of feelings (CP.1.574). Contrary to how aesthetics is often conceived,
it  is  not limited to feelings of  beauty or that which is  detachedly pleasant in some
regard.  Peirce  is  clear  that  such  one-sidedness  regarding  aesthetic  experience  is
misguided. Feelings are aesthetically good and bad (CP.5.551). He clarifies that good and
bad aesthetic  feelings  are  closely  aligned with pleasure  and pain,  but  they are  not
equivalent.  Pleasure and pain are symptoms of  feelings.  In the case of  pain,  Peirce
claims that it is “a symptom of a feeling which repels us” (CP.5.552). Pain is a symptom
of discomfort. 
12 Shusterman advances Peirce’s conception of experience and recognizes that the body is
the  basis  of  aesthetic  experience  (Shusterman  2009:  180).4 Feeling  –  Firstness  –
regarding the body is somatic perception, whereas reflection upon the feeling is somatic
reflection (ibid.: 14). The interplay between these types of somatic experience is helpful
for  understanding  how  discomfort  occurs  with  increased  awareness  within  the
aesthetic  realm.  Shusterman  interprets  Peirce  as  providing  material  for  enhancing
somaesthetic  awareness,  noting that  how one reflects  upon feeling affects  how one
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feels.  The  way  one  engages  in  somatic  reflection  about  discomfort  affects  feeling
discomfort.  This  shifts  a  person  from  non-aesthetic  consciousness  to  somaesthetic
awareness. Shusterman states that somaesthetics “treats the body as soma – a living,
sentient, subjectivity rather than a mere mechanical mechanism or tool that is used by
something else (a mind or soul or person). The soma is not just a tool for perception
and action but  also  the  purposive,  intentional  agency that  deploys  tools  (including
bodily  organs)  in  perceiving  (i.e.,  aesthesis)  and  acting”  (ibid.:  22).  Understanding
discomfort  somaesthetically  is  to  recognize  the  potential  for  enhanced  bodily
awareness  that  contributes  to  inquiry  and  how  one  trains  the  body  to  experience
discomfort. 
13 Through  somaesthetic  reflection,  somaesthetic  perception  is  habituated  to  be
increasingly receptive to feeling. With respect to discomfort, enhanced somaesthetic
awareness provides increased readiness for feeling what Leder calls the dys-appearance
of the body and Svenaeus calls the unhomelike feeling in the world (see above). Greater
somaesthetic awareness also enables more nuanced thoughts regarding such feeling
and inquiry concerning adjustments pertaining to discomfort. As Xenakis and Arnellos
indicate, aesthetics is an evaluative process that is borne from the intersection between
oneself and the world and provides greater awareness of how one engages with one’s
world (Xenakis & Arnellos 2015). Recognizing discomfort as somaesthetic points to the
possibility  of  training  oneself  to  recognize  contexts  that  tend  to  cause  bodily
discomfort.  Additionally,  such  recognition  allows  for  training  in  somaesthetic
reflection, honing skills that enhance abilities to reflect upon and remedy feelings of
discomfort.
 
3. Somaesthetics of Discomfort
14 Aesthetics of bodily discomfort is relevant to any practice. All practices are rooted in
the body and, as Peirce indicates, feeling “is consciousness in its first state” (CP.7.551).
Examples  of  practices  that  are  overtly  relevant  to  somaesthetics  of  discomfort  are
physical exercise and athletics, gross and fine motor skills and movements, and bodily
positions,  such  as  being  seated  or  standing.  Receptivity  to  feelings  of  discomfort
enhance  one’s  ability  to  experience  nuances  of  feeling  as  they  occur.  Related  to
practices,  such  as  the  Alexander  Technique  of  which Dewey  was  a  devotee,
somaesthetics of discomfort extends into fine-grained quality of feeling – how feelings
are experienced (Firsts), how feelings are recognized as being the case (Seconds), and
how  feelings  are  categorized  or  generalized  (Thirds).  For  example,  somaesthetic
awareness of discomfort during exercise entails feeling what might have otherwise felt
like  a  general  discomfort  as  a  form of  cramping,  burning,  shooting,  or  other  more
specific type of discomfort of which the exerciser has learned to become acutely aware
through  the  dynamic  of  somaesthetic  perception  and  somaesthetic  reflection. The
exerciser is not only able to feel discomfort in its qualitative richness but may also be
better  able  to  inquire  and  adjust  to  such  discomfort  because  of  somaesthetic
perception. Reflection upon past discomfort provides richer feelings of discomfort if
they recur. Similarly, aesthetic awareness of discomfort provides greater specificity to
reflection concerning probable causes, symptoms, and remedies for the feeling.5
15 An example of the importance of somaesthetic awareness of discomfort during exercise
is the feeling of back discomfort. Many exercises, especially when done with improper
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form  or  too  much  weight,  cause  mild  discomfort  without  immediate  pain.  By
developing keen somaesthetic perception, wherein one is attuned to subtleties in back
discomfort  during  exercise,  one  is  better  able  to  address  issues  occurring  from
improper  form  or  excessive  weight  with  greater  precision  than  if  one  was  not
somaesthetically perceptive to nuances in discomfort. 
16 Similar types of somaesthetic perception pertain to sitting. Ergonomics is a field that
focuses on feelings of  discomfort,  especially those that are subtle and only develop
after long hours of being seated. Measurements of comfort and discomfort are often
reported in studies about workstations and chairs (Helander et  al. 1987; Helander &
Zhang 1997). These studies, although not explicitly somaesthetic, focus on subtleties
and  nuances  of  discomfort  that  are  detected  through  research  amenable  to
somaesthetic  perception  and  somaesthetic  reflection.  Measures  established  for
assessing comfort and discomfort, such as the General Comfort Rating (GCR) scale and
the Body Part Discomfort (BPD) scale, attempt to capture discomfort as a set of scalar
feelings that vary by intensity (Corlett & Bishop 1976). Although scales are quantified
generalizations of discomfort, they are tools that may contribute to the development of
somaesthetics and help designers solve problems in the design and use of workstations
and  chair  design.  Researchers,  such  as  David  Bissell,  acknowledge  the  aesthetic
sensibility  involved  in  being  sedentary,  including  the  domain  of  seating,  and work
toward developing tools to help analyze transient feelings of comfort and discomfort
(Bissell 2008). Developing somaesthetics of discomfort is important for improving one’s
abilities to be receptive to varying degrees and types of discomfort and to build from
somaesthetic perception of discomfort to somaesthetic reflection about discomfort. 
17 By improving sensitivity to discomfort as aesthetic experience, one may enhance their
abilities to communicate discomfort more specifically to others,  as well  as be more
receptive to the specific discomforts that others experience. In fields such as nursing,
analysis  of  comfort  and discomfort  helps  patients  and healthcare  workers  enhance
their  sensitivity  to  feeling  so  as  to  develop  more  advanced  vocabularies  regarding
discomfort  (Kolcaba,  Tilton  &  Drouin  2006;  Kolcaba  1995;  Kolcaba  1994;  Kolcaba  &
Kolcaba 1991).  Disability studies have also contributed to increasing the capacity to
recognize  how  different  bodies  experience  spaces  differently,  including  feeling
varieties  of  discomfort  (Hansen  &  Philo  2007;  Evans  2006;  Tolia-Kelly  2006).
Somaesthetics  of  discomfort  strengthens the work being done in  these  domains  by
calling attention to the fine-grained experiences of discomfort and developing tools to
discern and differentiate between feelings of discomfort. These are rich areas of work




18 Acute awareness of feeling provides enhanced somaesthetic reflection, which advances
habits  that  facilitate  greater  precision to  inquiries  concerning discomfort.  Through
somaesthetics, discomfort is recognized as a call to inquiry. Just as one may become
habituated to detecting beauty in objects and events, thus training the senses to feel
the  subtleties  of  beauty,  one  may  become  habituated  to  detecting  discomfort
somaesthetically,  developing a  keen sense  of  bodily  feeling attuned to  moments  or
situations wherein the body is not at home in the world. Somaesthetics of discomfort is
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an extension of heightened somatic self-awareness and a means for enhancing one’s
awareness  of  others’  discomfort.  Recognizing  the  subtle  variations  of  one’s  own
discomforts provides a basis for openness to the varieties of discomfort experienced by
bodies different than one’s own. Coupled with tools, such as those found in graphic and
narrative  medicine,  persons  who develop a  keen somaesthetic  sensibility  regarding
discomfort also develop strengths in moral imagination and empathy.6 Cultivating such
bodily awareness promotes somatic self-consciousness and increases the capacity to be
receptive to how others experience and communicate their discomfort. Education of
somaesthetic perception and somaesthetic reflection of this type provides benefits to a
variety of  fields,  such as  healthcare and design.  Some specific  design domains that
benefit from somaesthetics of discomfort include interior and structural design, public
transit, and tool design.7 Being attuned to the aesthetics of bodily discomfort relates to
other forms of discomfort that are rooted in feeling but are beyond the scope of this
essay, such as psychological, social, and political discomfort. Developing aesthetics of
bodily discomfort provides a foundation for understanding other forms that branch
into multiple domains of experience and study.
19 In the final paragraph of Shusterman’s Body Consciousness, he states (Shusterman 2008:
216; emphasis mine):
Enchanting  intensities  of  experience  can  thus  be  achieved  in  everyday  living
without  requiring  violent  measures  of  sensory  intensification  that  threaten
ourselves  and  others.  And  if  we  still  prefer  more  dangerous  psychosomatic
experiences  of  extreme intensity,  our  somaesthetically  cultivated  sensory  awareness
should render us  more alert  to  the imminent risks  and also  more skilled in avoiding or
diminishing the damage.
20 Somaesthetics of discomfort fits within the scope of the sensory awareness Shusterman
indicates,  but this  is  a  field that requires more examination.  I  believe that there is
immense potential for aesthetic work to be done on discomfort that will provide tools
for people to develop greater self-awareness and empathy for others. If the basis of
inquiry is irritation, as Peirce phrases the inception of doubt, then the irritation as
discomfort is a suitable feeling to begin investigations concerning the body. Inquiry
begins with discomfort, and the way discomfort is felt – and how attuned one is to one’s
discomfort  or  that  of  others –  directs  the  inquiring  process.  Through  in-depth
examination, I  believe that somaesthetics of discomfort will  enhance other areas of
aesthetics, ethics, and logic, in the sense that Peirce and Dewey use these concepts in
their work. 
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NOTES
1. Following current philosophical trends, this could be conceived as epistemic discomfort, though I
believe Peirce and Dewey would hesitate to use the limiting qualifier.
2. For the sake of this argument, I only consider transient discomfort, not chronic discomfort.
Additionally, I do not here explore the concept of pain as related or conflated with discomfort
(see below). I also do not consider discomfort in terms of mood, language, or politics. Although
these types of  discomfort certainly give rise to inquiry and may be concomitant with bodily
discomfort, they do not pertain to somaesthetic experience as discussed in the following.
3. Also see Dewey’s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (LW.12: 73-6).
4. Shusterman acknowledges a similar point in Dewey’s Art as Experience regarding the “biological
body” as the “roots of the esthetic” (Shusterman 2008: 180; LW.10: 20, 26). 
5. This is related to Alexander’s notions of “debauched kinaesthetic systems” and faulty “sense-
appreciation,”  but  without  assuming  a  correct  or  standard  kinaesthetic  awareness  of  self
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(Shusterman  2008:  191).  Somaesthetics  of  discomfort  is  focused  on  enhancing  sensitivity  to
discomfort rather than necessarily finding flaws in one’s own bodily comportment.  Although
such flaws  might  be  detected  through increased  bodily  awareness  of  discomfort,  this  is  not
presumed as the causal basis of discomfort.
6. Graphic medicine is a rapidly growing field that utilizes comic books and graphic novels for
expression  and  education  concerning  all  facets  of  healthcare  and  medicine.  For  a  general
overview of graphic medicine, cf. Czerwiec et al. 2015. Regarding graphic medicine and empathy
more specifically, cf. Ronan & Czerwiec 2020. Regarding developing moral imagination through
aesthetic sensibility, cf. Johnson 1985; Mullin 2004; Waddock 2010.
7. Aesthetics of discomfort and design relate to everyday aesthetics, such as that put forth by
Saito (2017). This topic is beyond the scope of this essay, but I believe it is a field that could bear
worthwhile  tools  to  understand experiences  of  discomfort  with  a  focus  on  the  aesthetics  of
everyday situations, objects, and environments.
ABSTRACTS
This essay presents somaesthetics of discomfort as an extension of the field of somaesthetics as
developed by Shusterman.  Using the work of  Peirce and Dewey as  a  foundation upon which
Shusterman and Johnson have considered the body as the basis  of  aesthetics,  I  propose that
somaesthetics  of  discomfort  provides  a  means  of  enhancing bodily  awareness  and reflection
useful for domains of inquiry, such as healthcare and design. Taking Peirce’s notion of the
irritation of doubt in a literal sense, I explore bodily discomfort as the inception of inquiry. I
consider work done by phenomenologists concerning experiences of comfort and discomfort,
which includes definitions of each. My argument follows the perspective put forth by Peirce,
Dewey, and contemporary pragmatists that experience is qualitative and that feeling is at the
root of reflection. I explain how discomfort may be considered a type of aesthetic experience and
provide examples of bodily discomfort as somaesthetic. In closing, I consider somaesthetic focus
on discomfort as fostering moral imagination and empathy.
AUTHOR
MARK TSCHAEPE
Prairie View A&M University
mdtschaepe[at]pvamu.edu
Somaesthetics of Discomfort
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XIII-1 | 2021
10
